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Jeffrey D. Kubik  
*Syracuse University*

Harrison Hong  
*Princeton University and National Bureau of Economic Research*

Jeremy Stein  
*Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research*

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The Only Game in Town:  
Stock-Price Consequences of Local Bias

by

Harrison Hong  
Jeffrey D. Kubik  
and  
Jeremy C. Stein

July 2005

Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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# **The Only Game in Town: Stock-Price Consequences of Local Bias**

Harrison Hong  
Princeton University

Jeffrey D. Kubik  
Syracuse University

Jeremy C. Stein  
Harvard University and NBER

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Abstract: Theory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region. We test this proposition using data on U.S. Census regions and states, and find clear-cut support for it. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita. Regions with low population density—e.g., the Deep South—are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an “only-game-in-town” effect. This effect is especially pronounced for smaller, less visible firms, where the impact of location on stock prices is roughly 12 percent.

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## I. Introduction

A number of recent papers document that investors have a tendency to be strongly locally biased in their portfolio choices. This bias shows up not only as a preference for domestic as opposed to foreign stocks (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)), but perhaps more strikingly, as a preference for those domestic stocks that are headquartered close by (Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Huberman (2001)). Both professional money managers and individual investors exhibit some degree of local bias, though it is substantially stronger among individuals (Zhu (2003)).

While the existence of within-country local bias now seems to be incontrovertible, there is little evidence regarding its equilibrium asset-pricing implications.<sup>1</sup> In particular, we know of no work that attempts to relate the *level* of a firm's stock price to market conditions in its home locale.<sup>2</sup> Yet basic theoretical considerations suggest that such a link should exist. The logic is most easily seen by considering an extreme case of local preference in which investors only ever purchase the stocks of companies headquartered in, say, their home state. In this case, each state is its own autarkic capital market, with a risk premium that is determined—loosely speaking—by the ratio of the total supply of shares in the state to the total risk tolerance of investors living in the state.

In what follows, we investigate this hypothesis. We begin by constructing a variable we call *RATIO*, which for any given region at any point in time, is equal to the aggregate book value

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<sup>1</sup> This is in contrast to the large literature that examines the effects of international market segmentation on asset prices. We discuss this literature in detail in Section V below.

<sup>2</sup> See however, Coval and Moskowitz (2001), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2004), who demonstrate that investors—both institutions and individuals—earn excess returns from their investments in local stocks. These findings suggest that local bias is associated with some effect on asset prices.

of all firms headquartered in the region, divided by the aggregate income of all households living in the region.<sup>3</sup> We do this both for individual states, as well as for the nine U.S. Census regions. Next, we run cross-sectional regressions of the log of a firm's market-to-book on *RATIO*, as well as several controls (including firm return on equity, R&D-to-sales, and industry and exchange dummies). Using a sample period that runs from 1970-2001, we find that the *RATIO* variable has a negative impact on stock prices. The results emerge at both the state and the Census-region levels, though they are somewhat stronger in the latter case. If one goes from the Census region with the highest value of *RATIO* (the Middle Atlantic), to the region with the lowest value (the Deep South), holding all else equal, the implied increase in the stock price is approximately 7.3 percent.

Digging deeper, we find that our results are intimately connected to regional variation in population density. That is, regions with low population density—of which the Deep South is an example—tend to have low values of *RATIO*, which are associated with higher stock prices. This is because most of the variation in *RATIO* across regions is driven by the book value component, which is very sensitive to population density. Specifically, if one rewrites *RATIO* as total book value per capita divided by income per capita, it turns out that both per-capita variables are positively related to population density, but that book value per capita is much more responsive to density than is income per capita. In other words, in spite of low per-capita income, the Deep South is associated with higher stock prices because of an “only-game-in-town” effect: any one company headquartered there faces relatively little competition for local investors' dollars, because so few *other* companies are headquartered there.

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<sup>3</sup> Household wealth would arguably be a better proxy for risk tolerance than income, but we have more complete data on income at the regional level.

Of course, the close correlation between population density and RATIO begs the question of whether the former is a variable that can legitimately be excluded from the right-hand side of the regression. In other words, are there reasons to think that population density might proxy for some other economic factor that exerts an independent influence on stock prices? One possibility is that regions with low population density have greater future growth prospects, and that it is these superior growth prospects that drive higher stock prices. We attempt to control for this possibility by adding to our baseline regressions a series of future-growth variables, such as future income growth at the regional level, as well as future sales growth and profitability at the firm level. None of these controls materially alter our basic results.

A related concern is that there may be compositional differences in the sorts of firms that are located in different parts of the country, and that are not fully captured by SIC-code based industry dummies. For example, it might be that even within an SIC-defined industry, firms located in the Deep South use a different production technology—e.g., one that is more or less human-capital-intensive—than firms located in the Middle Atlantic, and that these technology differences are what lie behind the observed patterns in stock prices.

In an effort to come to grips with this issue, we re-run our baseline analysis on a subsample of electric utility firms. The premise here is that electric utilities are a relatively homogeneous set of firms with a common technology. Moreover, due to high effective transport costs, electric utilities are necessarily distributed widely across the country, which helps to address the concern that firms with different characteristics endogenously select into different regions. Interestingly, our basic results not only hold up for this subsample, the economic magnitudes are noticeably stronger: our point estimates suggest that an electric utility located in the Deep South has a stock price 14.5 percent higher than one located in the Middle Atlantic.

Finally, another way to make further progress on the identification problem is to test some of the theory's subsidiary implications. As we demonstrate with the help of a simple model, the *RATIO* variable should be expected to have the largest impact on the prices of those firms that are least visible outside of their home regions, and whose shares must therefore be absorbed mostly by local investors. Put another way, even though Microsoft is located in the state of Washington, we might not expect its stock price to be too strongly affected by local-market conditions in Washington, since Microsoft is so well-known to investors everywhere else.

Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the effect of *RATIO* on stock prices is significantly greater for smaller firms. In particular, for firms below the sample median size, a move in *RATIO* from its Middle-Atlantic value to its Deep-South value is associated with a 12.3 percent increase in stock prices. By contrast, the corresponding figure for firms above the sample median size is only 3.3 percent.

The fact that the *RATIO* variable interacts this way with firm size lends further support to our theory, and helps to cut against the alternative that population density—and by extension, *RATIO*—is just capturing some other unspecified regional factor that matters for stock prices. More precisely, as long as we are willing to adopt the identifying assumption that this other unspecified factor does not have a *differential* effect across firms of different sizes, the interaction results can be seen as decisive.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop a simple model that helps to motivate our tests. In Section III, we describe the data we use, and the construction of our principal variables. The empirical results are presented in Section IV. Section V discusses related work, and Section VI concludes.

## II. The Model

### A. Basic Assumptions

There are  $N$  regions of the country. In each region, there are two kinds of firms: “visible” (V) firms and “hometown” (H) firms. In each region, there are also two kinds of investors: “generalists” and “local experts”. A generalist can only invest in (i.e., is only aware of) visible firms, though he is not restricted to those in his region—he can invest in visible firms everywhere. A local expert can also invest in visible firms, and in addition, can invest in less-well-known hometown firms, but *only those hometown firms in his own region*.

Denote visible firm  $i$ , located in region  $j$ , by  $F_{ij}^V$ . Analogously, denote hometown firm  $i$ , located in region  $j$ , by  $F_{ij}^H$ . Firm  $F_{ij}^V$  has a book value of  $B_{ij}^V$ , and will pay a liquidating dividend at time 1 of  $r_{ij}^V B_{ij}^V$ , where  $r_{ij}^V$ —which can be loosely thought of as the firm’s return on book equity—is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of  $R_{ij}^V$  and a variance that for simplicity is normalized to one for all firms. Similar notation applies for the  $H$  firms.

All investors are assumed to have constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility, and the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in region  $j$  is given by  $T_j$ . A fraction  $\theta$  of this risk tolerance comes from the generalists, and a fraction  $(1 - \theta)$  comes from the local experts. The riskless interest rate between time 0 and time 1 is zero.

To simplify the analysis, we further assume that across all firms in all regions, the realizations of the  $r$ ’s are perfectly correlated. This can be thought of as a reduced-form approximation to a one-factor arbitrage-pricing-theory (APT) world, as in Ross (1973), where even within any single region, there are enough hometown firms that a local expert can create a perfectly diversified portfolio that eliminates all idiosyncratic risk.



## B. Prices With Only Hometown Firms

To begin, let us consider the simple case where there are only hometown firms—i.e., visible firms do not exist, and hence there is no role for the generalists. We are interested in the pricing of hometown firms in a given region  $j$ . Given the perfect-correlation assumption, we can aggregate these firms into a single combined firm. Call the total time-0 market value of this combined hometown firm  $V_j^H$ . The expected payoff to this combined firm at time 1 is given by  $\sum_i (R_{ij}^H B_{ij}^H)$ . Similarly, the variance of the payoff to this combined firm is given by  $(\sum_i B_{ij}^H)^2$ . Since there is total risk tolerance for hometown firms of  $(1 - \theta)T_j$  in region  $j$ , standard CARA-normal arguments imply that:

$$V_j^H = \sum_i (R_{ij}^H B_{ij}^H) - (\sum_i B_{ij}^H)^2 / (1 - \theta)T_j \quad (1)$$

By symmetry, it follows that the market-to-book ratio for any one hometown firm  $i$ , denoted by  $Q_{ij}^H$ , is given by:<sup>4</sup>

$$Q_{ij}^H = R_{ij}^H - (\sum_i B_{ij}^H) / (1 - \theta)T_j \quad (2)$$

The intuition for equation (2) is straightforward. The greater the aggregate book value of firms in a given region, the more risk local investors have to bear, and consequently, the greater

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<sup>4</sup> It is easy to see that the firm-level pricing relationship in (2) aggregates up to the region-level relationship in (1). In other words, we have that  $V_j^H = \sum_i (Q_{ij}^H B_{ij}^H)$ .

is the discount borne by all firms in that region.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, equation (2) suggests a very direct empirical test. In particular, we have:

**Hypothesis 1:** Consider a regression of a firm's market-to-book ratio against: i) its ROE; and ii) the ratio of the total dollar book value of firms in its region to some proxy for total regional risk tolerance. We expect the former variable to attract a positive coefficient, and the latter to attract a negative coefficient.

To operationalize a test of this hypothesis, we create an empirical measure, *RATIO*, that uses total region income as a proxy for regional risk tolerance. We also make a few other minor modifications (e.g., added controls, and a log transformation of the market-to-book ratio). But our baseline regression specification can be thought of as directly motivated by equation (2).

The derivation of equation (2) is made particularly easy by the assumption that all firms in a region have perfectly correlated returns. As noted above, this is a shortcut way to incorporate the CAPM/APT premise that within a region, investors are fully diversified, and hence only care about systematic risk. But we should emphasize that this sort of CAPM/APT approach is not the only way to generate the result. For example, one might go to the other extreme, and assume that all risk is idiosyncratic, and that each local investor only holds a single hometown stock, instead of a well-diversified local portfolio. If it is also the case that the risk tolerance devoted to any one stock in a region is proportional to its book value—i.e., that a

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<sup>5</sup> In the spirit of a segmented-market CAPM or APT, it is straightforward to extend the model to a setting where individual stocks in a region have different loadings on the market factor—i.e., different betas. In this case, the price discount for a given stock depends on its own beta, multiplied by a region-level discount factor like that in equation (2). However, since we do not test the beta-related implications of the model, we suppress them for simplicity. In other words, we treat all stocks as if they have betas of one.

bigger company has a greater probability of getting noticed and hence a larger investor base—a pricing formula identical to that in equation (2) once again emerges.

### C. Prices With Hometown Firms and Visible Firms

We now turn to the case where there are both hometown and visible firms, and both local-expert and generalist investors. To solve the model in this case, we conjecture the following outcome: i) generalists absorb all the shares of visible firms; and ii) local experts absorb all the shares of their respective hometown firms. With this conjecture in place, it is easy to calculate the prices of the different types of firms. The conjectured outcome will then only be an equilibrium only if, given these prices, local experts *choose* not to invest at all in visible firms because these firms are too expensive; we will have to come back and verify the conditions under which this holds.

If local investors do indeed restrict themselves to holding only hometown firms, the pricing of these hometown firms is exactly as before, and continues to be given by equation (2). Analogously, if visible firms are held only by generalists, we can calculate the market-to-book ratio for any visible firm:

$$Q_{ij}^V = R_{ij}^V - (\sum_j \sum_i B_{ij}^V) / (\theta \sum_j T_j) \quad (3)$$

Intuitively, the difference between equations (2) and (3) is that the generalists pool their risk tolerance together across all the regions, but at the same time they have to absorb the book value of all visible firms across all regions.

In order for this all to be an equilibrium, we require that the risk premium earned by local experts be greater in every region than that earned by generalists. In this way, the local experts will stick to their hometown stocks, and not invest in visible stocks, as conjectured.<sup>6</sup> This requires that:

$$(\sum_i B_{ij}^H)/(1 - \theta)T_j > (\sum_j \sum_i B_{ij}^V)/(\theta \sum_j T_j) \text{ for all } j. \quad (4)$$

This condition is most easily satisfied if: i)  $\theta$  is large, in which case there are a lot of generalists, which pushes down the expected return to visible stocks; or ii) the book value of hometown stocks is high relative to the book value of visible stocks, which pushes up the expected return to hometown stocks.

Assuming that (4) does hold, Hypothesis 1 continues to apply as stated above, although we must now note two caveats. First, if we use observations on all firms in the regression, we will be blurring together the hometown firms—for which the prediction holds—and the visible firms, for which it does not hold. Second, even focusing on observations corresponding to hometown firms, equation (2) tells us that what should go in the numerator of the theoretically ideal ratio variable is the aggregate book value of *hometown* firms in a region, which we cannot measure. So when we use the book value of *all* firms in a region (both visible and hometown) to build our empirical RATIO measure, this constitutes a form of measurement error, which will bias our estimates downwards. This sort of measurement error will be less of a problem to the extent that  $\sum_i B_{ij}^H$  and  $\sum_i B_{ij}^V$  are highly correlated at the regional level.

In addition to Hypothesis 1, we now also have:

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<sup>6</sup> We also need to assume that local experts cannot short the more expensive visible stocks; otherwise, given our perfect-correlation assumption, it would be a riskless arbitrage for them to do so while buying local stocks.

**Hypothesis 2:** Consider a regression of a firm's market-to-book ratio against: i) its ROE; and ii) the ratio of the total dollar book value of firms in its region to some proxy for total regional risk tolerance. We expect the negative coefficient on the latter variable to be larger in absolute magnitude for hometown firms than for visible firms.

In the literal context of the model, Hypothesis 2 emerges very starkly, since all visible firms trade in the national market and have exactly the same risk premium. This fact, which is apparent from equation (3), implies that for visible firms, the regression coefficient on the ratio variable should be exactly zero.

The model also makes a third prediction, which is built in by virtue of the assumption that condition (4) holds:

**Hypothesis 3:** Controlling for ROE, we expect visible firms to have higher values of market-to-book than hometown firms.

The proposition that visibility increases stock prices is essentially a restatement of Merton's (1987) well-known argument. Although this proposition seems eminently reasonable, we do not consider it further in what follows, and instead focus our efforts on Hypotheses 1 and 2. We do so for a couple of reasons. First of all, there is already a large literature on the stock-price implications of visibility.<sup>7</sup> Second, our empirical framework is not well-suited to dealing with the obvious endogeneity problems that accompany any direct attempt to test Hypothesis 3.

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<sup>7</sup>Empirical work on this topic includes Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Botosan (1997), Amihud, Mendelson and Uno (1999), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and Brennan and Tamarowski (2003).

For any measure of visibility that one can think of—and absent a convincing instrument—there is always going to be the question of whether visibility causes higher stock prices, or vice-versa.<sup>8</sup>

### **III. Data**

#### **A. Sources**

Our data on personal income and other regional and state demographic variables come from a database produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Personal Income and Population Summary Estimates. It is available on the BEA's website, [www.bea.doc.gov](http://www.bea.doc.gov), going back to 1969. We limit our analysis to the time period from 1970 through 2001.

Our data on firms come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT. From CRSP, we obtain stock prices and shares outstanding for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. From COMPUSTAT, we obtain annual information on a variety of accounting variables, as well the locations of firms' headquarters. To be included in our sample, a firm must first have the requisite financial data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, and must have headquarters in the lower 48 states or in the District of Columbia (i.e., we drop firms located in Alaska and Hawaii).

When we run our regressions, we exclude observations on firms with book equity values of less than 10 million dollars, as well as those with one-digit SIC codes of 6, which are in the financial-services industry. However, the book values of these firms are kept for the purposes of computing the aggregate book value of firms in a region, which is a key component of our RATIO variable.

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<sup>8</sup> Note that the endogeneity of visibility is less of a problem in the interactive type of specification suggested by Hypothesis 2. Here, we will be on safe ground so long as the reverse-causality effect of stock prices on visibility does not differ across regions in a particular way.

## B. Variable Definitions

The market equity value of a firm ( $M$ ), defined as the combined value of all common stock classes outstanding, is taken from CRSP as of fiscal year end. For the book equity value ( $B$ ), we use COMPUSTAT data item 60. Our primary dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity, i.e.,  $\log(M/B)$ . We take logs because the raw market-to-book ratio is highly skewed, and the log transformation results in a variable that is much closer to being symmetrically distributed. However, we obtain similar (albeit somewhat less precisely estimated) results if we instead work with the raw market-to-book ratio. Alternatively, we can use the book-to-market ratio as the dependent variable, which also leads to results very similar to those we report below, though of course with all of the signs reversed. Finally, we have also experimented with an entirely different valuation measure, a firm's cashflow-to-price ratio,  $C/M$ , where cashflow  $C$  is net income (item 172) plus depreciation (item 14). As we describe in more detail below, this too leads to the same qualitative results.

The BEA database reports total personal income by state and breaks the personal income down by its various parts, including dividend income. Our main independent variable of interest,  $RATIO$ , is the ratio of total book equity in a region to total personal income in that region. In calculating personal income, we exclude dividend income, on the notion that keeping it in might induce an artificial, hard-wired relationship between  $RATIO$  and stock prices.<sup>9</sup> We calculate  $RATIO$  in two ways, by Census region (nine regions in all) and by state. The BEA database also

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<sup>9</sup> If, controlling for ROE, higher dividends are associated with higher stock prices, it is conceivable that a region with a lot of dividend income—and hence a lower value of  $RATIO$ , if dividends are included in the calculation of  $RATIO$ —would show up as having higher valuations on average.

reports per capita income and population density by state, which we can aggregate up to get analogs for Census regions.

A firm's return on book equity (ROE) is its net income (COMPUSTAT data item 172) divided by its previous-year book equity (item 60 lagged one year). R&D expenditures and sales are items 46 and 12, respectively, and we use these to create an R&D-to-sales ratio. The log market-to-book ratio, ROE and R&D-to-sales ratio are all winsorized at the one-percent and 99-percent levels. When the R&D variable is missing, we set its value to zero; however, we also include on the right-hand-side of all our regressions a dummy variable that equals one when a firm does not report R&D.

For the purposes of one of our robustness checks, we create a dummy variable that equals one for a conglomerate, which we define as a firm that operates in more than one business segment. Information regarding firm segments on COMPUSTAT only begins in 1983. So our analysis involving this variable is limited to the sub-sample that runs from 1983 to 2001. If a firm is missing segment data, we assume that it is not a conglomerate, and set the dummy variable to zero.

In another robustness check, we drop observations corresponding to any firms that belong to a dominant industry in its region. For each region (whether it be a Census region or a state) and for each year, we calculate the book value of firms in each two-digit SIC industry, and we deem an industry to be dominant if it accounts for more than 10 percent of the total book value in that region. Note that we only drop these dominant-industry firms from the left-hand-side of our regressions, but keep them in when calculating the total book equity of firms in a Census region or state.



### C. Anatomy of the RATIO Variable

Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the RATIO variable. In Panel A, we display the value of RATIO for each Census region once every five years between 1970 and 2001, along with both cross-sectional and time-series means and standard deviations. As can be seen, the Middle Atlantic region has consistently had the highest values of RATIO, averaging 0.94 over the sample period. New England runs a close second, with an average RATIO of 0.87. At the other extreme, the Deep South has the lowest average value over the entire sample period, at 0.21, though it has been catching up over time: in 1970, the Deep South was far behind all other regions at 0.07, while by 2000, it had passed the Mountain region, at 0.50 vs. 0.34.

In Panel B, we show the analogous data at the state level. In keeping with the patterns seen in Panel A, states like Connecticut, New York, Michigan and Illinois are among those with the highest values of RATIO, while states like Wyoming, Montana, West Virginia and Vermont rank near the bottom. Even a superficial glance suggests that there seems to be a close link between the RATIO variable and population density.

In order to better understand what is driving the RATIO variable, we take logs and write the log of RATIO as equal to the log of regional book value per capita, minus the log of regional income per capita. Using this decomposition, we can, in any yearly cross-section, ask how much of the variance of the log of RATIO is coming from each of these two terms. The answer is that the lion's share comes from the log of book value per capita: at the Census region level, an average of 74 percent of the total variance of the log of RATIO comes from the log of book value per capita, while at the state level, the corresponding figure is 79 percent.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> These figures represent the time-series mean values of cross-sectional variance decompositions done on an annual basis.

Table 2 relates this decomposition explicitly to regional differences in population density. We run annual cross-sectional regressions with three different dependent variables: i) the log of *RATIO*; ii) the log of book value per capita; and iii) the log of income per capita. In each case, the sole explanatory variable is regional population density. In Panel A, the regressions are run on Census-region-level data, and in Panel B, they are run on state-level data.

In column 1 of Panel A, it can be seen that the log of *RATIO* is highly correlated with population density; this confirms the informal impressions from Table 1. The R-squared in the univariate regression averages 0.41, which is equivalent to a correlation coefficient of 0.64. Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate that both components of the log of *RATIO* are also positively correlated with population density, but that the book value term is considerably more sensitive to population density than the income term, with an average regression coefficient of 0.608 vs. 0.287.<sup>11</sup> In other words, as population density goes up, both book value per capita and income per capita rise too, but the former effect is much stronger than the latter, so that on net, *RATIO* increases as well. The patterns are qualitatively similar in Panel B, with the state-level data, albeit muted: for example, the R-squared in the regression of the log of *RATIO* on population density now averages 0.16, corresponding to a correlation coefficient of 0.40.

With a little reflection, the strong effect of population density on book value per capita—and, ultimately, on *RATIO*—makes intuitive sense. There are many reasons why firms would prefer, all else equal, to locate their headquarters and/or their major operating facilities in densely populated areas: better infrastructure (e.g., large international airports); access to a deeper and higher-quality labor pool; etc. Indeed, these sorts of agglomeration effects provide perhaps the most natural way of thinking about the root source of variation in our *RATIO* measure.

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<sup>11</sup> Again, these figures represent the time-series means of cross-sectional regression coefficients.

## **IV. Empirical Results**

### **A. Baseline Specification**

Our baseline specification is designed to test Hypothesis 1. The dependent variable is the log of the market-to-book ratio for a firm. The independent variables are *RATIO*, firm ROE, firm R&D-to-sales, a dummy for whether the firm reports R&D expenditures, a set of 2-digit SIC industry dummies, and dummies for exchange listing (NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ). In one variant, *RATIO* is measured at the Census-region level, while in another, it is measured at the state level.

To further protect against hardwiring, we recalculate the *RATIO* variable for each firm-year observation so that the numerator of *RATIO* omits the book value of the firm in question. That is, for an observation on firm  $i$  in year  $t$ , the corresponding *RATIO* variable includes the book value of all the *other* firms in  $i$ 's region in year  $t$ , but does not include  $i$ 's book value. This ensures that when we obtain a negative coefficient in a regression of log market-to-book against *RATIO*, it is not coming simply because the same book value is in the denominator of the left-hand-side variable and the numerator of the right-hand-side variable. It also implies that while the values of *RATIO* for firms in a given region/year cell are very highly correlated, they are not literally identical.<sup>12</sup>

### **B. Statistical Inference: Methodological Issues**

Given the nature of our data, we need to think carefully about the correlation structure of the residuals, and about the resulting implications for how we calculate standard errors. First,

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<sup>12</sup> As it turns out, this adjustment is of no consequence. We obtain essentially identical results if we make no adjustment to the *RATIO* variable and use exactly the same value for all firms in a given region/year cell.

note that in any given year, we only have nine effectively independent observations on *RATIO* if we are working at the Census-region level, and 49 if we are working at the state level. In other words, we should expect to have a high degree of cross-correlation in the residuals at a given point in time.

As one method for dealing with this cross-correlation, we take a Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach, running a separate cross-sectional regression each year from 1970 to 2001—a total of 32 regressions in all. We then compute the means of the annual regression coefficients. Finally, we evaluate the statistical significance of the means based on an in-sample estimate of the time-series variance of the annual coefficients, one that adjusts for serial correlation in these coefficients.

However, as Petersen (2005) points out, the Fama-MacBeth approach—even with a serial-correlation adjustment—can lead to understated standard errors if there are fixed or slowly-decaying effects in the data. To see this point most clearly, consider an extreme example where the data for each of the 32 years in our sample are literally identical. In this case, the annual regression coefficients will also be identical, so the Fama-MacBeth method will inappropriately generate estimated standard errors that approach zero.

As an alternative that does better in the presence of fixed or slowly-decaying effects, Petersen (2005) suggests the use of a single pooled regression with clustered standard errors. To implement this procedure, we pool all the data, add year dummies, and also allow each of the control variables other than *RATIO* to take on a different value each year (i.e., these controls are all interacted with year dummies). We then cluster the standard errors at the region level.

To check that this approach is robust in the presence of fixed effects in our setting, we try the following experiment. First, we take a single year at random from our dataset, and run the

regression for just that year in isolation. Then, we create a fake 30-year panel which consists of 30 repetitions of that same one year, and apply our pooled-plus-clustering specification to the fake panel. Ideally, and in contrast to the Fama-MacBeth procedure, we should get the same standard errors with the one-year regression as with the fake 30-year panel, because there is no more information in the latter—i.e., the method should not be fooled by the presence of more years’ worth of observations if these observations are purely redundant. And indeed, this is what happens.<sup>13</sup> We conclude that Petersen’s (2005) arguments carry over to our setting, and that—unlike Fama-MacBeth—the pooled-plus-clustering methodology is robust to even the most extreme kind of fixed effects.

As a final reality check on our standard errors, we also try a “collapsed” version of our baseline specification. We implement this as follows. First, every year, we run a cross-sectional regression of log market-to-book against all of our control variables *except* RATIO, and use this regression to generate firm-level residual values of log market-to-book. Next, we collapse these firm-level residuals at the region-year level—i.e., we compute an equal-weighted average of the firm-level residuals within each region-year cell. In the case of Census regions, this gives us 9 observations on residual log market-to-book each year—one for each Census region—and a total of 288 observations for the entire 32-year sample period ( $288 = 9 \times 32$ ). We then run a simple panel regression on these 288 observations, with RATIO and year dummies as the only right-hand side variables, again clustering the standard errors at the region level to account for any serial correlation in the residuals.

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<sup>13</sup> For example, if we run the regression for just the single year 1995, we get a point estimate for the coefficient on RATIO of -0.145, with a standard error of 0.070. If we run the regression for a fake panel with 30 repetitions of the 1995 data, we get an identical point estimate, and an almost-identical standard error of 0.069. Similar results obtain if we start with any other year in our sample period.

This approach is appealing because it makes transparently clear that, in computing the standard errors, we are not claiming to have anything more than 9 independent observations per period. And comfortingly, it leads to results that are very close to those from the pooled regressions. Moreover, a modification of the collapsing technique also allows us to provide a simple graphical illustration of our results, which we will turn to shortly.

### **C. Detailed Results from Baseline Specifications**

Table 3 gives a detailed overview of our baseline results. In Panel A, *RATIO* is measured at the Census-region level, while in Panel B, it is measured at the state level. Consider first Panel A. When we use the Fama-MacBeth approach, the coefficient on *RATIO* takes on the predicted negative sign in 31 of the 32 regressions. Across all of the regressions, the mean value of the coefficient is -0.099, with a Fama-MacBeth (serial-correlation adjusted) standard error of 0.008. Not surprisingly, the coefficients on *ROE* and *R&D-to-sales* are both positive in each of the 32 regressions.<sup>14</sup>

As noted above, there is a concern that in our setting the Fama-MacBeth approach may produce understated standard errors. The results from the pooled and collapsed regressions bear out this concern. Although the point estimates for the coefficient on *RATIO* are very similar to those from the Fama-MacBeth specification, at -0.097 and -0.092 respectively, the standard errors are substantially larger, at 0.029 and 0.030. Nevertheless, even with these more

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<sup>14</sup> Using a Fama-MacBeth approach to inference is not as well-motivated in the case of the *ROE* and *R&D-to-sales* variables. With *RATIO*, there is an obvious concern about cross-correlated residuals, since there are effectively only nine distinct values of *RATIO* in a given cross-section; hence the motivation for the Fama-MacBeth technique. With *ROE* and *R&D-to-sales*, it is almost certainly the case that the Fama-MacBeth test statistics vastly understate the confidence one should have in the hypothesis that the true coefficients are in fact positive.

conservative standard errors, the coefficient on RATIO remains statistically significant at the one-percent level.

In much of what follows, we save space by focusing on the results from the pooled versions of the regressions. Again, this appears to be a conservative approach in our particular context, and one that is roughly equivalent to the collapsing technique.

The collapsing methodology is however especially useful for providing some further intuition into why, in spite of all the concerns about both cross-correlation and time-series correlation, we are able to obtain statistically significant estimates for the coefficient on RATIO. In Figure 1, we take the collapsing approach a step further, by averaging the data over time. For example, in Panel A, we plot the time-averaged value of residual log market-to-book for each Census region against the time-averaged value of RATIO, where this averaging is done over the entire sample period. In Panels B-G, we undertake a similar exercise, but average only over five-year intervals (e.g., 1970-74, 1975-79, etc.).

Thus in each case, we have boiled all the data down to just nine observations—discarding, among other things, any potentially useful information that might be embodied in year-to-year variation in RATIO. Yet as can be seen from the scatterplots, these nine observations alone tell a pretty clear story in most of the sample periods. For example, for the full sample, a regression based on the nine data points in Panel A yields a coefficient on RATIO of -0.080, a standard error of 0.036, and a t-statistic of 2.22. Thus it should not be too surprising that no matter how stringently we adjust our standard errors to account for various forms of correlation in the data—i.e., no matter how much we discount the effective number of independent observations—we still obtain statistically significant results.

To get a sense of economic magnitudes, recall that the average value of *RATIO* in the Middle Atlantic is 0.94, while the average value in the Deep South is 0.21. Thus if a firm moves from the Middle Atlantic to the Deep South, holding all else equal, the implied increase in the log of market-to-book based on the pooled estimate is 0.071 ( $0.097 \times (0.94 - 0.21) = 0.071$ ), i.e., the firm's stock price goes up by about 7.3 percent.

In Panel B of Table 3, everything else is the same, except we now measure *RATIO* at the state level. In this case, the coefficient on *RATIO* is negative in 29 of 32 years; it has a mean value of -0.039 and a Fama-MacBeth standard error of 0.006. The pooled specification yields a similar point estimate of -0.036 and a substantially-increased standard error of 0.019, which implies that the estimate is significant at only the 10 percent level. For the collapsed specification, the coefficient on *RATIO* is -0.041 with a standard error of 0.022, which is again significant at the 10 percent level. Thus overall, the state-level results are qualitatively similar to, but statistically weaker than, those at the Census-region level.

The associated economic effects are somewhat smaller as well. If we go from the state with the third-highest average value of *RATIO* (New York, at 1.28) to the state with the third-lowest average value (Montana, at 0.05), the implied increase in a firm's stock price based on the pooled specification is now 4.5 percent. This attenuation of our results relative to the Census-region case is consistent with the notion that investors' preferences for local stocks may extend somewhat beyond the confines of their home states, so that Census region is a better—though certainly not perfect—approximation to the relevant neighborhood. Alternatively, as we discuss below, it is likely that the state-level observations of *RATIO* are subject to a form of measurement error, and that this measurement-error problem is mitigated when we aggregate states up into Census regions.



#### D. Alternative Specifications

In Table 4, we experiment with a number of variations on our baseline specification. For compactness, we now display in each row of the table only the summary estimates associated with the pooled regression model. As before, Panel A uses the Census-region version of *RATIO*, while Panel B uses the state version. We begin our discussion with Panel A.

In Row 1 of Panel A, we reproduce our baseline pooled-regression result—a coefficient on the *RATIO* variable of -0.097. In Row 2, we add to the regression region per-capita income. This variable is itself completely insignificant, while the coefficient on *RATIO* is virtually unchanged, at -0.094. Intuitively, this tells us that our results for *RATIO* are driven almost entirely by variation in the numerator (i.e., book value per capita) and that there is not enough variation in the denominator (per-capita income) to isolate its separate contribution. Such a conclusion is not surprising, given the variance decomposition of *RATIO* discussed above.

In Row 3, we add to the baseline specification region population density. This variable not only attracts a significant negative coefficient, it also completely drives out *RATIO*. How should one interpret this result? We can imagine two possible views. On the one hand, it can be argued that there is no a priori theoretical reason for population density to go in these regressions. Thus to the extent that it enters significantly, it must be because it effectively cleans up a measurement error problem in our *RATIO* variable. Recall that in the numerator of *RATIO*, we have the book value of firms *headquartered* in a given region. However, it is entirely possible that what matters for local bias is not merely the location of a firm’s headquarters, but rather the extent of its operating presence (e.g., major manufacturing plants, large R&D campuses) in a given regional economy. Moreover, it may also be that a region’s population

density better captures the aggregate presence of publicly listed firms than does the book value of firms that are nominally headquartered there.<sup>15</sup>

The state of Delaware provides a stark illustration of this point. Over the entire sample period, Delaware has the second-highest average value of *RATIO* among all states, at 1.84. It seems likely that this high value is attributable in part to Delaware's uniquely dominant role in the market for firm incorporations, which might be expected to lead a disproportionate number of firms to also list their nominal headquarters as being in Delaware, even if they do not have much of a real operating presence in the state.<sup>16</sup>

Under this measurement-error interpretation, it is neither surprising, nor bad news for our theory, that population density takes out *RATIO* in an OLS horse race. A more problematic alternative is that population density is a proxy for some other omitted factor that does legitimately belong in the regression. For example, it may be that regions with low population density have the greatest potential for future growth, which would naturally translate into higher expected cashflows for the firms located there. Fortunately, it is possible to address this sort of alternative hypothesis directly, which we do in Row 4-7. In Row 4, we add to the baseline specification a term for future region-level income growth, defined as the rate of growth of total region income over years  $t+1$  through  $t+3$ .<sup>17</sup> This future-growth variable attracts a positive coefficient, as expected, but the impact on *RATIO* is negligible—its coefficient drops in absolute value from -0.097 to -0.094, and it remains strongly significant. In Rows 5 and 6, we add in turn

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<sup>15</sup> As discussed above, there are many reasons why firms would want to locate their major facilities in densely populated areas.

<sup>16</sup> See Bebchuk and Cohen (2003), who document that as of 1999, 58 percent of all public firms were incorporated in Delaware.

<sup>17</sup> We have experimented with variations on the timing—e.g., going five or ten years out when measuring future income growth—with little difference to the results.

to the baseline regression average future firm ROE, and future firm sales growth, again measured in each case over years  $t+1$  through  $t+3$ . While both of these future firm-level variables have strong positive effects on stock prices, neither appreciably alters the estimated coefficient on *RATIO*.

Finally, in Row 7, we add all three future-growth terms to the regression simultaneously. Even in this case, *RATIO* is only modestly changed, at -0.081. Overall, these variations lead us to conclude that population density is probably not proxying for any kind of directly value-relevant factor—at least not one that shows up in future cashflows.

In Row 8, we return to our baseline specification, but drop all observations corresponding to those firms which belong to “dominant” industries in their region. More precisely, we drop any firm whose 2-digit SIC industry accounts for more than 10 percent of the total book value in a region. (We continue to keep these firms for the purposes of calculating the *RATIO* variable, however.) The idea here is that if there is still some relevant uncontrolled-for factor at the regional level, it is likely to have more of an effect on dominant-industry firms. For example, suppose that—in the spirit of a multifactor APT—there is an extra risk premium on stocks that are heavily exposed to auto-industry risk. It just so happens that Michigan has one of the highest average values of *RATIO* in the sample, at 1.13. So one might conceivably argue that perhaps Michigan firms have relatively low market-to-book values not because of a *RATIO* effect, but because of their high loading on auto-industry risk. By eliminating dominant-industry firms, we throw out any auto firms that happen to be located in Michigan, which should tend to mitigate this type of problem.<sup>18</sup> As it turns out, this adjustment has little effect on our results; the coefficient on *RATIO* falls only slightly, to -0.091.

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<sup>18</sup> When applied to Michigan, our dominant-industry screen excludes the 2-digit SIC industry described as “transportation manufacturing”, which includes automakers.

In Rows 9-11, we experiment with three other controls that might be expected to have some impact on market-to-book ratios: a conglomerate dummy, the log of firm sales, and an S&P 500 index dummy. None of these controls makes any appreciable difference to the coefficient on the RATIO variable.<sup>19</sup>

The patterns in Panel B of Table 4, which uses the state-level measure of RATIO, are generally quite similar to those in Panel A, in the sense that none of the variations lead to much change in the coefficient on RATIO from its baseline value of -0.036.<sup>20</sup> The one noteworthy exception occurs in Row 3, the horse race between RATIO and population density. In contrast to what we saw in the Census-region data, the coefficient on RATIO now only drops modestly—from -0.036 to -0.029—with the addition of population density. As a purely mechanical matter, population density has less scope for taking out RATIO at the state level, simply because the correlation between these two variables is not as strong as at the Census-region level (as seen in Table 2).

In addition to the variations reported in Table 4, we have experimented with several other robustness checks. Perhaps most notably, we have redone everything in Tables 3 and 4 with an alternative valuation measure on the left-hand-side of the regressions: the ratio of cashflow to market value. The results run closely parallel to those for the log of market-to-book (though of course all the signs are reversed). In terms of economic magnitudes, the pooled regression coefficients imply that as we move from the Middle Atlantic to the Deep South, a firm's cashflow-to-price ratio falls by 0.0078. Relative to the sample median cashflow-to-price ratio of

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<sup>19</sup> The coefficient on the S&P dummy is surprisingly large, at 0.171. But note that this does not imply that the causal effect of S&P inclusion on stock prices is on the order of 17 percent. It may just be that a high market capitalization is a criterion for S&P inclusion, above and beyond a high book value. We have also experimented with a number of other controls such as firm age and found similar results.

<sup>20</sup> As might be expected from the baseline results, the statistical significance of the various state-level regressions in Panel B of Table 4 is generally less impressive. Of the 11 regressions, three produce coefficients on RATIO that are significant at the 5 percent level, and four others produce coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level.

0.120, this is a 6.5 percent effect, very close to the 7.3 percent effect obtained from the comparable specification for the log of market-to-book.<sup>21</sup>

### **E. Evidence From Electric Utilities**

One potential objection to our results thus far goes as follows. Firms' locations are the product of an endogenous choice, and even within an SIC-code-defined industry, there may be firms with different technologies that imply different optimal locations. For example, a firm whose strategy relies heavily on the human capital of computer scientists is presumably more likely to locate where such scientists are abundant, say in the Boston area or Silicon Valley. In contrast, a firm whose technology is relatively land-intensive is more likely to go where real estate is cheap. To the extent that these factors are also correlated with valuations—e.g., human-capital-intensive firms trade at a discount—our inferences could be affected.

In an effort to confront this problem, we re-run our baseline regressions on the subsample of electric utility firms. Our premise here is twofold. First, electric utilities are likely to have relatively homogeneous production technologies across different parts of the country. Second, the fact that there are effectively prohibitive transport costs in this industry implies that the endogenous location-selection effect is unlikely to be at work. Simply put, each region of the country has to have its own locally-based utilities; there is no scope for all firms in the industry to move, e.g., to the Deep South because land or unskilled labor there is cheaper.

Our sample of electric utilities is drawn from firms in SIC codes 4911 (“establishments engaged in the generation, transmission and/or distribution of electric energy for sale”) and 4931

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<sup>21</sup> Two details about our cashflow-to-price regressions are worth noting. First, any negative values of the cashflow-to-price ratio are reset to zero. Second, given that the left-hand-side variable now includes a measure of profitability, we drop ROE from the right-hand-side of the regressions.

(“establishments primarily engaged in providing electric services in combination with other services, with electric services as the major part though less than 95 percent of the total”). There are roughly 100 such firms in the sample in any given year, with some year-to-year variation.<sup>22</sup> And, as expected, these firms are widely distributed across different regions of the country.<sup>23</sup>

Table 5 presents the results that emerge when our baseline pooled regression specification is applied to the electric-utility subsample. At the Census-region level, the coefficient on *RATIO* is -0.186. This estimate is substantially higher than the corresponding full-sample figure of -0.097, and, in spite of the much-reduced sample size, it is statistically significant at the one-percent level. In economic terms, the coefficient implies that an electric utility located in the Deep South has a stock price 14.5 percent higher than one located in the Middle Atlantic, all else equal. These numbers would seem to constitute a strong argument against the claim that our previous findings are the product of some sort of endogenous location-selection mechanism.<sup>24</sup>

Panel H of Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of our Census-region-level results for electric utilities, using the same collapsing/time-averaging technique over the full sample period as in Panel A of the figure. As can be seen, the scatterplot is very striking. The nine individual observations hug the regression line closely, producing a point estimate of -0.239 for

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<sup>22</sup> There are 94 electric utilities in the sample in 1970, 109 in 1975, 110 in 1980, 113 in 1985, 105 in 1990, 98 in 1995, and 74 in 2001.

<sup>23</sup> Of the 74 electric utilities in the sample in 2001, 8 were in the New England region, 9 in the Middle Atlantic, 12 in the Midwest, 12 in the Plains, 14 in the Atlantic Coast, 3 in the Deep South, 6 in the Southern Plains, 6 in the Mountain, and 4 in the Pacific.

<sup>24</sup> Similarly large magnitudes emerge if we use cashflow-to-price as the dependent variable in our regressions for electric utilities: for Census regions, the pooled coefficient on *RATIO* in such a regression is 0.026 (with a standard error of 0.015); this is more than double the corresponding figure of 0.011 (with a standard error of 0.003) for the sample of all firms.

the coefficient on *RATIO*, with a standard error of 0.074. Thus even with this most conservative approach to inference, the results for electric utilities are remarkably clear-cut.

At the state level, the coefficient on *RATIO* for electric utilities is again higher than in the corresponding full-sample case, at -0.051 as compared to -0.036. However the estimate is not statistically significant. This may be due to the simple fact that with such a small number of firms in the utility sample, there are many states (roughly ten in a typical year) with no observations at all, which further compromises the already-low power of the state-level tests.

#### **F. The Interaction of *RATIO* and Visibility**

We now turn to our tests of Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the *RATIO* variable should have a stronger effect on the prices of less visible firms. To operationalize this hypothesis, we proxy for visibility with firm size. Specifically, we create a small-firm indicator that equals one when firm size, as measured by sales, is below the sample median value in a given year. We then take our baseline pooled regression specification from Table 3, and add two new terms: the small-firm dummy, and the interaction of this dummy with *RATIO*. Our interest is in the interaction term, which we predict will attract a negative coefficient.

Table 6 presents the results. Row 1 uses the Census-region measure of *RATIO*, and Row 2 uses the state measure. In Row 1, the coefficient on *RATIO* is -0.045, and the coefficient on the interaction of *RATIO* and the small-firm dummy is -0.114, with the latter being statistically significant. These estimates imply that, for a low-visibility (i.e., small) firm, moving from the Middle Atlantic to the Deep South is associated with a 12.3 percent increase in the stock price. In contrast, for a high-visibility (i.e., large) firm, the effect is only 3.3 percent.

In Row 2, with state-level data, the coefficient on *RATIO* is -0.024, and the coefficient on the interaction of *RATIO* and the small-firm dummy is -0.029, suggesting that the effect of *RATIO* is more than doubled for small firms as compared to big firms. However, in this case the interaction term is not statistically significant.

In addition to firm size, we have experimented with two other measures of visibility: i) the total number of shareholders that a firm has; and ii) an indicator for the presence of a top-200 “megabrand” as reported by the trade publication *Advertising Age* (which in turn bases its megabrand classification on total media advertising expenditures). Both of these variables yield strong interaction effects of the predicted sign in the Census-level data, especially the megabrand variable, which generates a very large interaction coefficient.<sup>25</sup> However, because of collinearity and because we have limited statistical power to begin with, we cannot reliably disentangle these interaction effects from those related to firm size.

## **V. Discussion**

### **A. Implications for Expected Returns and Arbitrage**

We have framed our entire empirical analysis in terms of the *level* of stock prices. But as a logical matter, our theory makes a corresponding set of predictions about stock returns. In particular, a stock located in a region with a low value of *RATIO* should have a high price precisely because it has a low expected return. Moreover, casting the tests in terms of expected returns would seem to have the added advantage of more fully controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in future cashflows. For example, if stocks located in the Deep South have higher prices, there is always the worry that this is in part because there is some missing Deep-South

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<sup>25</sup> In a pooled Census-region specification analogous to that in Row 1 of Table 6, the coefficient on the interaction of *RATIO* and a no-megabrand dummy is -0.253, with a standard error of 0.147.



factor (e.g., hidden long-run growth potential) that will ultimately lead to higher cashflows and hence justify the higher prices. If, however, Deep-South stocks have persistently lower returns, such an alternative hypothesis can be dismissed.

So why not look at returns instead of price levels? The answer is that, since all risk premia in our model are permanent in nature, the sorts of price effects that we have documented translate into very small expected-return differentials—far too small to show up as statistically significant, given the power of such tests.<sup>26</sup> To see this concretely, think of a stock with a price-earnings (P/E) ratio of 20. In a simple perpetuity formula, this corresponds to a value of  $(k - g)$  of 5 percent, where  $k$  is the discount rate and  $g$  is the growth rate. Now raise the price of the stock by 15 percent, so that the P/E goes to 23. Relative to our price-level estimates in the previous section, this is a large increase, roughly corresponding to the extremes of the RATIO spectrum among smaller firms, or among electric utilities. Yet even with this aggressive calibration, the implied value of  $(k - g)$  only falls to 4.35 percent. In other words, the expected return only drops by 65 basis points per year.<sup>27</sup>

This same line of reasoning also sheds light on why arbitrage is unlikely to eliminate the price-level effects that we have documented.<sup>28</sup> To exploit the pricing discrepancies across regions, an arbitrageur would have to, e.g., buy the stocks of less-visible Middle-Atlantic firms, and short the stocks of less-visible Deep-South firms. In doing so, he would incur substantial regional risk—the economy of the Deep South could boom unexpectedly relative to that of the

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<sup>26</sup> It is presumably for this same reason that the literature on index inclusion effects (initiated by Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986)) always looks at prices, rather than expected returns. To the extent that any inclusion effect is both permanent and modest in magnitude, it makes little sense to test the hypothesis that, say, S&P 500 stocks have lower expected returns than non-S&P 500 stocks.

<sup>27</sup> We have in fact tried the expected-return versions of our tests. Not surprisingly, while the point estimates almost always go in the right direction—i.e., higher values of RATIO are generally associated with higher future returns—none of these estimates are close to being statistically significant.

<sup>28</sup> See Petajisto (2004) for a related discussion.

Middle Atlantic, thereby devastating his position—all for an annualized alpha (before transactions costs) on the order of 65 basis points. This hardly seems like an attractive trading strategy. Thus in contrast to other, faster-converging phenomena like medium-term momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) or post-earnings-announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990)), here we have a case where there are economically meaningful price-level effects, but little that would be of interest to a money manager.

## **B. International Asset Pricing with Segmented Markets**

There is a clear parallel between our work and the literature on international asset pricing in the presence of segmented markets. One major branch of this literature adopts a CAPM perspective, and asks whether expected returns on stocks in a given small country are driven by their betas with respect to the home-country market portfolio, or their betas with respect to the world market portfolio.<sup>29</sup> Typically, the home-country and world equity premia are taken as exogenous in these papers, and little effort is devoted to understanding their determinants. In contrast, we completely ignore beta considerations: in our model, both the local-market and national-market betas of all stocks are effectively set equal to one. Thus our analysis can be thought of as focusing exclusively on the determinants of average local-market equity premia.<sup>30</sup>

It is natural to wonder what implications, if any, our results have for cross-country differences in asset prices. At a general level, they would certainly seem to suggest that local-market supply and demand factors can have meaningful consequences for price levels. At the

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<sup>29</sup> Notable papers include Stulz (1981), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiraman (1986), Jorion and Schwartz (1986), Wheatley (1988), Hietala (1989), Bailey and Jagtiani (1994), and Chari and Henry (2004).

<sup>30</sup> In this regard, we are posing a question somewhat analogous to Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and Henry (2000). Both of these papers show that on average, prices go up—and equity premia presumably go down—when an emerging stock market is opened up to foreign investment.

same time, it would probably be naïve to run cross-country versions of our regressions—with country-wide analogs to the *RATIO* variable—and expect to get similar results.

One obvious complicating factor has to do with differences across countries in financial development. For example, a country with weak investor protection is likely to have both lower stock prices (LaPorta et al (2002)) as well as fewer publicly-listed firms (LaPorta et al (1997)), and hence a lower value of *RATIO*. To the extent that it is not possible to control perfectly for the degree of investor protection, this effect will tend to obscure the negative relationship between *RATIO* and stock prices that we observe in the U.S. data. Said differently, we have seen that within the U.S., cross-region differences in *RATIO* are driven largely by variation in population density. And we have argued that this sort of variation is plausibly exogenous with respect to the level of stock prices. However, when one looks across countries, other factors (e.g., investor protection) are likely to play a much bigger role in influencing *RATIO*, and these other factors may well not be exogenous with respect to stock prices.

## **VI. Conclusions**

The basic message of this paper is a simple one: like many other goods and services, stocks have prices that can be materially influenced by local supply and demand conditions.<sup>31</sup> Just as one would expect the price of a hotel room to be lower in a city where hotel rooms are plentiful, so too is the price of a firm's stock lower if it is located in a region where it must compete for investors' dollars with many other nearby firms. The magnitude of this effect is surprisingly large, especially among smaller, less-visible firms, where the implied price differentials across Census regions are as high as 12 percent.

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<sup>31</sup> This conclusion is very much in the spirit of Summers (1985).

In closing, we should stress two implications that our analysis *does not* have. First, there is nothing in our results that suggests that any given firm can be made better off—in the sense of generating a higher stock price—by moving to a region with a lower value of *RATIO*. Recall that every one of our specifications looks at the effect of the *RATIO* variable *holding fixed firm profitability*, as measured by *ROE*. And it is obviously unlikely that a typical firm located in a high-*RATIO* state like New York could move to a low-*RATIO* state like West Virginia without adversely affecting its profitability.

Second, in spite of the relatively large stock-price effects that we document, there is little here of interest to would-be arbitrageurs. Given that location exerts a permanent influence on expected returns, it takes only a small rate-of-return wedge to generate the sorts of price-level differentials that we see in the data. Thus any arbitrage strategy based on our findings is likely to have a very small alpha relative to the associated risks and transactions costs. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that even our most aggressive price-level estimates can be defended as economically plausible, since they do not suggest any easily exploitable arbitrage opportunities.

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**Table 1: Summary Statistics for RATIO, 1970-2001**

The entries are values of RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income (less dividends) in a given region. Panel A reports RATIO for the nine Census regions in every fifth year, starting in 1970, as well as the time-series means and standard deviations (using all the years, 1970-2001). In addition, for each of the years shown, the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of RATIO are also reported. Panel B is similar to Panel A except that RATIO is reported at the state level for 48 states (Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.)

**Panel A: Summary Statistics by Census Region**

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	Mean	S.D.
New England	0.75	0.94	0.97	0.81	0.76	0.84	0.91	0.87	0.08
Middle Atlantic	0.87	1.03	1.05	0.87	0.77	0.84	1.16	0.94	0.13
Midwest	0.75	0.81	0.77	0.84	0.76	0.75	0.66	0.76	0.06
Plains	0.25	0.34	0.38	0.38	0.36	0.50	0.69	0.42	0.12
Atlantic Coast	0.35	0.43	0.37	0.38	0.36	0.43	0.54	0.41	0.05
Deep South	0.07	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.29	0.50	0.21	0.13
Southern Plains	0.66	0.76	0.72	0.64	0.57	0.63	0.87	0.69	0.09
Mountain	0.27	0.31	0.25	0.36	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.31	0.04
West Coast	0.33	0.41	0.40	0.39	0.37	0.48	0.78	0.44	0.10
X-sectional Mean	0.48	0.58	0.56	0.54	0.49	0.57	0.72		
X-sectional S.D.	0.28	0.31	0.32	0.26	0.23	0.21	0.25		



### Panel B: Summary Statistics by State

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	Mean	S.D.
New England									
Connecticut	1.92	2.31	2.45	1.89	1.76	1.73	1.67	2.00	.26
Massachusetts	0.27	0.42	0.38	0.43	0.39	0.56	0.75	.46	.11
Maine	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.09	0.13	.07	.03
New Hampshire	0.12	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.09	0.22	0.11	.16	.04
Rhode Island	0.44	0.56	0.62	0.52	0.60	0.69	0.72	.61	.08
Vermont	-	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.10	0.11	.06	.05
Middle Atlantic									
New Jersey	0.49	0.61	0.57	0.57	0.50	0.57	0.73	.58	.07
New York	1.14	1.36	1.46	1.17	1.05	1.16	1.71	1.28	.21
Pennsylvania	0.65	0.77	0.75	0.57	0.50	0.52	0.54	.61	.12
Midwest									
Illinois	0.86	0.99	1.01	1.09	0.98	1.01	0.93	.99	.06
Indiana	0.09	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.18	0.24	0.29	.20	.05
Michigan	1.41	1.34	1.08	1.28	1.28	1.01	0.61	1.13	.27
Ohio	0.52	0.61	0.67	0.68	0.48	0.59	0.69	.60	.09
Wisconsin	0.22	0.34	0.32	0.29	0.28	0.36	0.36	.31	.04
Plains									
Iowa	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.15	0.16	0.22	0.16	.15	.05
Kansas	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.15	.10	.03
Minnesota	0.40	0.55	0.59	0.55	0.46	0.60	0.68	.55	.07
Missouri	0.35	0.50	0.54	0.53	0.49	0.61	0.77	.55	.11
North Dakota	-	-	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.10	.03	.04
Nebraska	-	0.29	0.31	0.44	0.61	1.16	2.44	.78	.72
South Dakota	-	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.15	0.17	.06	.05
Atlantic Coast									
Delaware	1.78	2.32	1.80	2.00	1.81	1.14	1.42	1.84	.38
District of Columbia	0.19	0.51	0.65	0.68	0.91	2.05	2.14	1.05	.70
Florida	0.20	0.26	0.21	0.16	0.13	0.21	0.26	.21	.05
Georgia	0.27	0.38	0.36	0.52	0.54	0.59	0.79	.50	.15
Maryland	0.26	0.30	0.28	0.27	0.23	0.27	0.31	.27	.02
North Carolina	0.27	0.37	0.33	0.30	0.27	0.51	0.89	.42	.20
South Carolina	0.08	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.17	.13	.03
Virginia	0.74	0.76	0.69	0.68	0.59	0.61	0.52	.66	.09
West Virginia	-	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.06	0.07	0.05	.03	.03
Deep South									
Alabama	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.18	0.19	0.28	0.40	.19	.11
Kentucky	0.10	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.22	0.16	.17	.03
Mississippi	-	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.18	1.35	.27	.45
Tennessee	0.07	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.13	0.36	0.41	.23	.11
Southern Plains									
Arkansas	0.05	0.09	0.13	0.24	0.45	0.80	1.14	.41	.36
Louisiana	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.19	0.26	0.29	.20	.05
Oklahoma	0.53	0.57	0.57	0.27	0.22	0.30	0.51	.42	.14
Texas	0.89	1.02	0.95	0.83	0.71	0.72	0.98	.88	.12
Mountain									
Arizona	0.39	0.43	0.32	0.30	0.21	0.21	0.22	.29	.08
Colorado	0.31	0.43	0.32	0.62	0.62	0.50	0.54	.47	.11
Idaho	0.43	0.39	0.39	0.42	0.40	0.38	0.62	.41	.07
Montana	-	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.13	.05	.05
New Mexico	-	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.11	0.12	.07	.05
Nevada	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.19	0.16	0.37	0.33	.19	.10
Utah	0.21	0.27	0.24	0.26	0.21	0.32	0.19	.25	.04
Wyoming	-	-	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	.01	.01
West Coast									
California	0.37	0.43	0.43	0.40	0.38	0.50	0.78	.46	.10
Oregon	0.07	0.22	0.26	0.27	0.33	0.39	0.28	.27	.08
Washington	0.19	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.39	1.01	.38	.17
Cross-sectional Mean	0.42	0.46	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.48	0.61		
Cross-sectional S.D.	0.46	0.51	0.48	0.44	0.41	0.42	0.55		

**Table 2: RATIO and its Components vs. Population Density, 1970-2001**

Each entry is the time-series mean of cross-sectional regression coefficients, estimated each year from 1970-2001. The dependent variables include: i) the log of RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income (less dividends) in a given region.; ii) the log of total book equity per capita in a region; and iii) the log of per capita income in a region. Each of these variables is regressed one at a time against population density in a region. In Panel A, all variables are measured at the Census-region level, and in Panel B, all variables are measured at the state level.

**Panel A: Results by Census Region**

Dependent Variable	Log(RATIO)	Log(Region Book/Capita)	Log(Region Income/Capita)
Coefficient× 100	.317 (.067)	.608 (.012)	.287 (.039)
R-squared	0.41	0.48	0.31

**Panel B: Results by State**

Dependent Variable	Log(RATIO)	Log(State Book/Capita)	Log(State Income/Capita)
Coefficient× 100	.208 (.025)	.333 (.041)	.122 (.023)
R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.09

**Table 3: RATIO and Stock Prices, Detailed Results**

The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. The independent variables are RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income for the region in which the firm is located, along with the firm's ratio of R&D to sales, and return on equity (ROE). Also included in the regressions (but not shown) are a dummy variable which equals one if the firm does not report R&D expenditures, a set of 2-digit SIC industry dummies, and dummies for exchange listing (NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ). Panel A reports the results for Census regions, and Panel B reports the results for states. Annual entries are the coefficients for RATIO, R&D to sales, and ROE, and the R-squareds of the cross-sectional regressions by year. Also reported are the time-series means of these yearly coefficients, the Fama-MacBeth (serial-correlation-adjusted) standard errors, and the fraction of the years in which the regression coefficients have the predicted signs. The last two lines of each panel report the results from: i) a single pooled regression in which the standard errors are clustered at the region level; ii) a collapsed regression in which there is only one averaged observation on residual log market-to-book for each region-year cell, and in which the standard errors are again clustered at the region level. In the pooled regression, there are year dummies, and the coefficients on all control variables other than RATIO are allowed to vary by year. In the collapsed regression, there are only year dummies in addition to the RATIO variable. Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

**Panel A: Results by Census Region**

	RATIO	R&D to Sales	ROE	R-squared
1970	-.049	8.01	2.98	0.46
1971	-.136	8.45	2.63	0.42
1972	-.074	8.65	3.63	0.48
1973	-.132	10.2	2.99	0.41
1974	-.133	8.01	1.70	0.33
1975	-.076	7.85	2.46	0.45
1976	-.083	6.71	2.26	0.42
1977	-.042	4.76	2.07	0.42
1978	-.084	5.00	2.22	0.45
1979	-.046	7.55	1.78	0.43
1980	-.094	5.80	2.07	0.49
1981	-.191	6.86	1.71	0.39
1982	-.086	3.70	1.26	0.33
1983	-.134	1.74	1.14	0.35
1984	-.107	1.40	1.04	0.31
1985	-.083	.714	.852	0.28
1986	-.043	.813	1.03	0.29
1987	-.152	.565	.727	0.24
1988	-.147	.280	.818	0.24
1989	-.129	.308	.832	0.27
1990	-.230	.749	1.07	0.30

1991	-.127	.938	1.17	0.33
1992	-.107	.716	.806	0.28
1993	.060	.452	.542	0.24
1994	-.088	.477	.636	0.24
1995	-.145	.661	.510	0.29
1996	-.168	.698	.435	0.28
1997	-.099	.508	.394	0.27
1998	-.071	.463	.444	0.28
1999	-.118	.673	.298	0.32
2000	-.016	.626	.555	0.33
2001	-.053	.283	.467	0.28
Avg Annual Coeff.	-.099***	3.27	1.36	
F-M standard error	(.008)	(3.05)	(1.20)	
# with correct sign	31/32	32/32	32/32	
Pooled Regression	-.097*** (.029)	--	--	
Collapsed Regression	-.092*** (.030)	--	--	

**Panel B: Results by State**

	RATIO	R&D to Sales	ROE	R-squared
1970	-.008	8.03	2.98	0.46
1971	-.052	8.42	2.63	0.41
1972	-.044	8.61	3.63	0.48
1973	-.051	10.2	2.98	0.41
1974	-.045	7.99	1.71	0.33
1975	-.018	7.84	2.47	0.44
1976	-.015	6.70	2.27	0.42
1977	-.010	4.77	2.08	0.42
1978	-.039	5.00	2.23	0.45
1979	-.030	7.52	1.78	0.43
1980	-.035	5.78	2.08	0.49
1981	-.088	6.81	1.72	0.39
1982	-.034	3.69	1.26	0.33
1983	-.076	1.75	1.14	0.35
1984	-.039	1.41	1.04	0.31
1985	-.059	.705	.849	0.28
1986	-.039	.807	1.03	0.29
1987	-.045	.568	.728	0.24
1988	-.042	.280	.820	0.24
1989	-.022	.315	.835	0.27
1990	-.102	.754	1.08	0.30
1991	-.086	.936	1.17	0.34
1992	-.095	.710	.804	0.28
1993	.017	.451	.540	0.24
1994	-.048	.476	.636	0.24
1995	-.049	.662	.508	0.29
1996	-.044	.699	.436	0.28
1997	-.018	.510	.395	0.27
1998	.004	.463	.441	0.28
1999	-.008	.673	.296	0.32
2000	.025	.626	.556	0.33
2001	-.038	.282	.464	0.28
Avg Annual Coeff.	-.039***	3.26	1.36	
F-M standard error	(.006)	(3.07)	(1.21)	
# with correct sign	29/32	32/32	32/32	
Pooled Regression	-.036* (.019)	--	--	
Collapsed Regression	-.041* (.022)	--	--	

**Table 4: RATIO and Stock Prices, Alternative Specifications**

The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. In addition to the independent variables in Table 3, Row 2 adds region per capita income. Row 3 adds region population density. Row 4 adds the growth rate of region income from year  $t+1$  to  $t+3$ . Row 5 adds the average firm ROE over years  $t+1$  through  $t+3$ . Row 6 adds the growth rate of firm sales from year  $t+1$  to  $t+3$ . Row 7 adds all the future controls in Rows 4-6 simultaneously. Row 8 removes observations corresponding to industries that account for more than ten percent of total book value in a region. Row 9 adds a dummy for whether a firm is a conglomerate. Row 10 adds the log of firms sales. Row 11 adds a dummy for S&P 500 index membership. Panel A reports the results for Census regions, and Panel B reports the results for states. All regressions are run using the pooled specification described in Table 3 with standard errors clustered at the region level. Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

**Panel A: Results by Census Region**

	RATIO	Future Region Inc. Growth	Future Firm ROE	Future Firm Sales Growth	Misc.
1. Baseline Specification	-.097*** (.029)				
2. Add Region Per Capita Income	-.094*** (.021)				-.353 (.719)
3. Add Region Population Density	-.006 (.026)				-.254*** (.051)
4. Add Future Region Income Growth	-.094*** (.028)	.211 (.164)			
5. Add Future Firm ROE	-.098*** (.029)		.044*** (.015)		
6. Add Future Firm Sales Growth	-.088*** (.030)			.093*** (.005)	
7. Add All Future Controls	-.081*** (.030)	.148 (.142)	.037*** (.012)	.092*** (.005)	
8. Remove Dominant Industries	-.091** (.041)				
9. Add Conglomerate Dummy	-.097** (.040)				-.067*** (.013)
10. Add Log Sales	-.099*** (.028)				.017** (.007)
11. Add S&P 500 Indicator	-.096*** (.030)				.171*** (.025)

**Panel B: Results by State**

	RATIO	Future State Inc. Growth	Future Firm ROE	Future Firm Sales Growth	Misc.
1. Baseline Specification	-.036* (.019)				
2. Add State Per Capita Income	-.038** (.019)				-.088 (.179)
3. Add State Population Density	-.029 (.021)				-.050* (.029)
4. Add Future State Income Growth	-.036** (.017)	.497*** (.130)			
5. Add Future Firm ROE	-.037* (.020)		.044*** (.014)		
6. Add Future Firm Sales Growth	-.033* (.020)			.093*** (.005)	
7. Add All Future Controls	-.029 (.019)	.423*** (.134)	.036*** (.011)	.092*** (.006)	
8. Remove Dominant Industries	-.031 (.027)				
9. Add Conglomerate Dummy	-.037 (.023)				-.067*** (.013)
10. Add Log Sales	-.038** (.019)				.017*** (.005)
11. Add S&P 500 Indicator	-.035* (.019)				.149*** (.044)

**Table 5: RATIO and Stock Prices for Electric Utilities**

This table presents pooled regressions identical to those in Table 3, but restricted to a sample of electric utilities, defined as firms with SIC codes of either 4911 or 4931. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. We keep all the same controls as in Table 3, but display only the coefficient estimates for RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income for the region in which the firm is located. The first row reports the results for Census regions, and the second row reports the results for states. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	Coefficient on RATIO
1. Census Regions	-.186*** (.071)
2. States	-.051 (.054)



**Table 6: Interaction of RATIO and Firm Size**

The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm. In addition to the independent variables in Table 3, each row adds a small-firm indicator (not shown) and the interaction of RATIO and the small-firm indicator. The small firm indicator equals one if the firm's sales are below the sample median value in a given year. The regressions are run using the pooled specification described in Table 3 with standard errors clustered at the region level. Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	RATIO	RATIO×Small-Firm Indicator
1. Census Regions	-.045 (.029)	-.114** (.050)
2. States	-.024* (.014)	-.029 (.030)

**Figure 1: Scatterplots of Residual Log Market-to-Book vs. RATIO**

In each panel, we plot averages of residual log market-to-book against time-averaged values of RATIO at the Census-region level. The residuals are based on cross-sectional regressions of log market-to-book against all the control variables in Table 3, excluding RATIO. These residuals are then averaged both across firms in a Census region, and then over time, with the time interval varying across the panels in the figures. In Panel A, the time averaging is done over the entire 1970-2001 sample period. In Panels B-G, the time-averaging is done over the indicated subsample periods. In Panel H, the time averaging is done over the entire 1970-2001 sample period, but we focus only on the subsample of electric utility firms. Census regions are indicated as follows on the plots: New England is NE; Middle Atlantic is MA; Midwest is MW; Plains is PL; Atlantic Coast is AT; Deep South is SO; Southern Plains is SP; Mountain is MT; and Pacific is PA. In each panel, we display the coefficient from the nine-data-point regression of average residual log market-to-book against average RATIO, along with the associated standard error.





